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I
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellee Woods
Cross, a municipal corporation, and the Defendant/Appellant Craig
Kirk.
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V
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Craig Kirk objects to the Woods Cross' Statement of facts,
paragraphs 1-19, for the reason that the alleged "Statement of
Facts does not comply with the provisions of Rule 24 (a)(7),
24(e) and 11(b) in that the alleged Statement of Facts does not
cite to the pages of the original record as required.
Furthermore, Mr. Kirk objects to paragraphs 18 through 27 of
Woods Cross' Brief for the reason that the alleged items referred
to in those paragraphs are not a part of the record for this
matter and, therefore, are not properly a part of this appeal
proceeding.

VI
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER
OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED WOODS CROSS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW IN
GRANTING WOODS CROSS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
Woods Cross asserts that it is undisputed that Craig Kirk
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owns property located at approximately 1450 West 500 South, Woods
Cross, Utah.
One mile?

What is approximately?

One block?

Two blocks?

Two miles?

It is, however, an undisputed fact that Craig Kirk does not
own the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross,
Utah, and that 1450 West 500 South is on the opposite side of the
street from the property Mr. Kirk owns on West 500 South, Woods
Cross.

To which wrong piece of property does the trial court's

order apply?
Woods Cross asks this Court to rule that Mr. Kirk owns the
property located at 1450 West 500 South Woods Cross, Utah because
someone obtaining a building permit put the address 1450 West 500
South on the building permit.
Mr. Kirk's agent.

Woods Cross claims that person was

However, there is no evidence in the record

showing that any such person was Mr. Kirk's "agent," or that Mr.
Kirk authorized the use of any specific address.

Furthermore,

Mr. Kirk was not the owner of the property at the time the
structure was built the property was owned jointly by a number of
individuals.

However, even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Kirk

owned the property at the time the structure was built, and even
assuming, arguendo, that the person who filled out the building
permit application was Mr. Kirk's agent, those facts still do not
make Mr. Kirk's property the property located at 1450 South 500
West, Woods Cross, Utah.
Woods Cross asserts that the trial court's order does not
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specify 1450 South 500 West but rather simply refers to "property
which is located on the south side of 500 South and west of 1400
West" and therefore the trial court's Judgment is sufficiently
descriptive.

If Mr. Kirk exchanges some of the property he owns

on the south side of 500 South for other property on the south
side of 500 south, does the trial court's order apply to that
property as well?

Is the trial court's order an order designed

to enforce a "zoning ordinance" against a certain piece of
property or is it an order directed at Mr. Kirk personally.

If

Mr. Kirk exchanges some of the property he owns on the south side
of 500 South for property on the north side of 500 South will he
still be subject to the trial court's order.

That property may

then actually be located at 1450 West 500 South.

Is Woods Cross

enforcing a zoning ordinance or harassing Mr. Kirk who is doing
nothing different from nearly all other owners of property along
500 South?
Woods Cross asserts that the trial court found that property
at issue was properly identified.
in the record?

Where is that statement found

Woods Cross says that Judge Johnson specifically

asked Mr. Kirk's attorney if Kirk owned property in the area to
which the pleading refereed and that Mr. Kirk's attorney answered
in the affirmative.

Where are those statements in the record?

Woods Cross further asserts that Judge Johnson explained that he
did not want any misunderstanding or issue regarding the property
that was the subject of the case and that Mr. Kirk's attorney
6
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disputed evidence the court is simply to determine if there are
issues of fact to be decided.

W. M. Barnes Co. V. Sohio Natural

Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981);

Spor v. Crested Butte

Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987).

On summary

judgment motion a court may only consider facts that are not in
dispute.

Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

A court may not consider the weight of testimony or credibility
of a witness on a motion for summary judgment.

The court simply

determines that there are no issues of material fact and that one
party is entitled summary judgment as a matter of law.

Singleton

v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v.
Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1987).
In the instant matter the trial court clearly chose to
accept the assertions contained in Woods Cross1 statement of
facts and the affidavits it filed in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment and to ignore the affidavit filed by Mr. Kirk
and the documents filed in support of his Memorandum in
Opposition to Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

That

decision was improper and constituted prejudicial and reversible
error.
Woods Cross next asserts that Mr. Kirk's affidavit saying
that he is not conducting any business on the property located at
1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross is a specious argument because
Mr. Kirk claims that he does not own the property located at 1450
West 500 South, Woods Cross.

Woods Cross asserts that Mr. Kirk's
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facts that are not in dispute.

Sorenson v. Beers, supra.

The

trial court violated the standard
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mi I ijninpi i in iii'i mi prejudicial and reversible error in granting

Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Therefore, the grant

of Summary Judgment entered in favor of Woods Cross must be
reversed.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT WOODS CROSS WAS
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In order for Woods Cross to prevail on its Motion for
Summary Judgment at the trial court level, Woods Cross had to
demonstrate that:

1) there were no issues of material fact

present in this matter which precluded the trial court from
granting Summary Judgment in favor of Woods Cross, and
2) that Woods Cross was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter
of law.

As established in by Appellant's Memorandum in

Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, genuine
issues of material fact are present which preclude the trial
court from granting Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Furthermore, Woods Cross did not, and could not, establish that
it was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
It is an indisputable principal of law that on a summary
judgment motion, the trial court must review the facts and law in
the light most favorable to the party against whom Summary
Judgment is sought. See
P.2d 980 (1972).

Judkins v. Toone, 27, Utah 2d 17, 492

A summary judgment must be supported by

evidence, admissions and inferences which, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the loser, show that "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law" such showing
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POINT in

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING WOODS
CROSS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. KIRK'S
COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
Woods Cross asserts that it was proper for the trial court
to grant Summary Judgment on Mr. Kirkfs affirmative defenses and
Counterclaim for the reason that Mr. Kirk had not exhausted his
administrative remedies. Woods Cross cites this Court to two
cases and to the Utah Code wherein it is stated that a person
must exhaust his administrative remedies before he challenges
land use decisions in the district court.

Neither of the cases

cited by Woods Cross, nor the provision of the Utah Code, are
applicable in this situation.
In the instant matter, Mr. Kirk did not seek judicial
relief.

Mr. Kirk was sued by Woods Cross. Mr. Kirk did not file

a complaint asking the trial court to rule that Woods Cross1
capricious and arbitrary land use decisions were invalid.

Mr.

Kirk simply responded to a law suit filed against him.
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter, Rule 12") states that a party to a law suit waives
all defenses not presented by motion or in his answer.

Mr. Kirk

as a defendant in this law suit had the obligation to raise all
affirmative defenses in either his Answer or in his Counterclaim,
or he would have been barred from ever raising those defenses.
See Tvcresen v. Magna Water Co.. 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456
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(1962); Bezner v, Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898
(Utah 1976).
Woods Cross is asking this Court to put Mr. Kirk in a no win
situation.

Woods Cross files a complaint against Mr. Kirk and

then asserts that Mr. Kirk cannot raise any defenses because he
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Mr. Kirk

cannot exhaust his administrative remedies because Woods Cross
has filed a complaint and then a summary judgment motion, which
is granted before Mr. Kirk can exhaust his administrative
remedies.
Mr. Kirk must assert his affirmative defenses and file his
compulsory counterclaim or be forever barred from asserting those
defenses and filing the counterclaim; yet, Woods Cross asserts he
cannot raise any affirmative defenses or file a counterclaim
because Mr. Kirk has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
If this Court buys into Woods Cross1 argument, Woods Cross can
preclude Mr. Kirk from ever obtaining due process.
If Mr. Kirk had filed this action, Woods Cross1 argument
would be a valid argument.

If Woods Cross had served Mr. Kirk

with cease and desist orders which Mr. Kirk had ignored, Woods
Cross1 argument would make more sense.

If Woods Cross had given

Mr. Kirk written notice that he was allegedly violating Woods
Cross zoning ordinances and given him instructions to comply with
Woods Cross1 zoning ordinances or follow the appropriate
administrative remedies to challenge the zoning ordinances and
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their alleged violation, Woods Cross1 argument would be valid.
However, the record does not even remotely imply that any such
actions took place.
Woods Cross simply filed a complaint against Mr. Kirk, moved
for summary judgment and said to the trial court, and now to this
Court, that Rule 12 be dammed, Mr. Kirk cannot raise any
affirmative defenses or file a counterclaim because he has not
exhausted his administrative remedies.

Precluding Mr. Kirk from

raising affirmative defenses and filing a compulsory counterclaim
in a case in which he is a defendant is a per se violation of Mr.
Kirk's due process rights.

Therefore, the trial court committed

prejudicial and reversible error when it granted Woods Cross'
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the trial court's decision must
be reversed and remanded.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING ON
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE MR. KIRK HAD
THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUBMIT EVIDENCE ON
HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
Woods Cross does not d i s p u t e Mr. K i r k ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t i t
improper t o entry summary judgment before d i s c o v e r y
incomplete.

is

is

Woods Cross, however, a s s e r t s t h a t Mr. Kirk i s

estopped t o r a i s e t h i s p o i n t of law on appeal, arguing t h a t i t

is

an i s s u e r a i s e d for t h e f i r s t time on appeal.
Woods Cross a l s o does not d i s p u t e Mr. Kirk's a s s e r t i o n t h a t
he never had t h e opportunity t o conduct any d i s c o v e r y or t h a t Mr.
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Kirk is entitled to conduct discovery or that discovery should be
liberally permitted.

Woods Cross simply asserts that Mr. Kirk is

estopped from raising the discovery issue on appeal.
Mr. Kirk admits that issues may not be raised for the first
time on appeal.
issue on appeal.

However, Mr. Kirk is not raising discovery as an
Mr. Kirk is simply stating a legal precedent to

demonstrate that Woods Cross was not entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.
If Mr. Kirk had had a trial in the lower court and failed to
raise the issue of discovery, admittedly, he could not raise that
claim on appeal for the first time.

However, in this matter, Mr.

Kirk was not given a trial and the trial court ruled that there
were no issues of fact and that Woods Cross was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.

Therefore, Mr. is not

estopped from raising any legal argument to demonstrate that
Woods Cross was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.

Therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial and

reversible error when it granted Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the trial court's decision must be reversed and
remanded.
POINT V
THE TRIAL C O U R T ERRED AS A MATTER OF L A W IN GRANTING W O O D S
CROSS' MOTION FOR S U M M A R Y JUDGMENT WITHOUT FIRST RULING O N
MR. KIRK'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT A N D WITHOUT
FIRST RULING O N APPELLANTS MOTIONS TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS
SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR S U M M A R Y
JUDGMENT.
Woods Cross asserts that because its counsel prepared a
15

judgment that stated "Defendant's counterclaim in its entirety is
dismissed" and "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike
Affidavits, and Motion to Stay Proceedings are denied," that the
Judgment establishes as a matter of fact that the trial court
entertained argument on those motions.

Again Ms. Romney, who

wasn't at the hearing, testifies as to what transpired at the
hearing.

She asserts that both parties addressed these motions

at oral argument.
that assertion.

Once again, where is the record to support
If Mr. Kirk's assertion that the motions were

never entertained on oral argument is false, then the record will
show that the motions were argued.

Mr. Kirk, however, cannot

prove a negative, i.e., that the motions were never argued or
addressed by the trial court.

Woods Cross, however, can prove

that oral argument was had on the motions, if any such argument
had take place.
Woods Cross has failed to do so because it cannot do so.
The self serving Judgment prepared by Woods Cross' counsel which
was never reviewed or approved by Mr. Kirk's counsel prior to
signing by Judge Johnson does not establish that any oral
argument was ever entertained on Mr. Kirk's Motion.

Nor does the

Judgment establish that the trial court ever considered the
Motions.

All the Judgment proves is that Judge Johnson signed a

judgment that Mr. Kirk's counsel did not approve as to form.
Woods Cross' Summary Judgment Motion was based on the
affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch,
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Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens.

Those affidavits were a

principal part of Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The

Affidavits allegedly established Mr. Kirk's violations complained
of in Appellee's Complaint.
The Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie
Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were based on hearsay,
speculation, conclusion, and opinion, and therefore, were not
admissible under the provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not

be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be
set forth in an affidavit supporting a motion for summary
judgment.

Walker v. Rockey Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274,

508 P.2d 538 (1973); Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v.
Blpmguist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972).
affidavits should not have been allowed.

The hearsay

Therefore, the trial

court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it failed
to consider or rule on Mr. Kirk's Motions to Strike the
Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch,
Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens prior to granting Woods Cross'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Because the trial court committed

prejudicial and reversible error in failing to rule on
Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson,
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens
prior to granting Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment, the
trial court's decision must be reversed and remanded.

17

POINT VI
(MR. KIRK'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS)
Mr. Kirk's appeal is based on hard facts and wellestablished law, and it supported by the record.
nothing frivolous about it.

There is

If Mr. Kirk's Appeal were frivolous,

this Court would have granted Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary
Disposition.

What is frivolous is Woods Cross1 asking this Court

for sanctions under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

vn
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error
when it granted Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary Judgement.
Therefore, the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment must be
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings•
WHEREFORE, Mr. Kirk respectfully request that the Summary
Judgment entered by the trial court be reversed and this matter
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

c

/'

day of August 1994.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

s

day of August 1994, I

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the
persons at the addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid.
Michael Z. Hayes
MAZURAN & HAYES P.C.
1245 East Brickyard Road Suite 250
SLC, UT 84106

Char 1 ear A. Schultz
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ADDENDUM
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(h)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 11(b)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24 (a)(7)
Utah Rules or Appellate Procedure Rule 24(e)
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raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "and complaint" in the first sentence.

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Motions generally,
U.R.C.P. 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction over the person.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Rights of opposing party.
Motion for more definite statement.
—Bill of particulars.
—Criteria.
—Motion to dismiss distinguished.
—Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
—Explained.
—Improper.
—Standard.
—Standard of review.
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
—Forum-selection clause in contract.
Presentation of defenses.
—How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
Divorce.
Election of remedies.
Failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted.

•

General and special appearances.
Statute of frauds.
Venue.
—When presented.
Amended answer.
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
—Failure to file.
Summary judgment.
—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
—Court's discretion.
—Court's initiative.
—Defenses.
—Opportunity to present pertinent material.
—Preclusion.
Issues of fact.
Waiver of defenses.
—Defect of parties.
—Defective service of process.
—Exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
When issues raised.
—Failure to join indispensable party.
—Failure to pay consideration.
—Mutual mistake.
—Statute of frauds.
—Statute of limitations.
—Waiver.

Rule 56
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scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v Hammon, 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
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from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment
Buckner v Main Realty & Ins. Co , 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P 2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d))
Cited m Utah Sand &
Gravel Prods. Corp. v
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965),
J P W
Enters
• I n c v Naef > 6 0 4 P 2 d 4 8 6
( U t a h 1979) K a t z v P l e r c e
>
> 732 P 2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Graham v Sawaya, 1981 B.YU L. Rev 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
t n a l o r f l h n g o f n e c e ssary papers, 21 A L R.3d
^255

H

, F * l l u r * t o g ' v e k n o t l c e °/ a P P h c a t l 0 n *>r d f
ault
f
J ^ 1 ^ ^ e ™ ™*l0c* 1S r e q u i r e d 0 n l y
bv
custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.LR. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134.

C . j l - 49 C J S Judgments <* 187 to 218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to habihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L R 3d
1070
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R 3d 586.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
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forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
'—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence
—Facts considered.
^—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.

Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Notice.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Findings by court.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
—Fraud or duress.
—Guardianship.
—Mortgage note.
—Negligence.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
—Note.
—Recovery for goods and services.
—Stock ownership. *'
—Wrongful possession.
Summary judgment proper.
—Contract action.
—Contract terms.
—Deceit.
—Jurisdiction.
—Negligence.

Rule 11
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(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and
consideration of the case.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
~
, ,
__
Dismissal by court.
Summary affirmance.
lime tor tiling.
Clted
*
Dismissal by court.
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
Summary affirmance.
Summary affirmance under this rule is a determination of the appeal on its merits, after
the parties have been afforded a full and adequate opportunity to present relevant argu-

ments and authorities. An appellate court's rejection of appellant's contentions as unmeritorioug does not d e n y h i m his
h t of appea,
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.
A p p 1 9 8 8 ) ; S t a t e y P a l m e i % 7 8 6 P 2<* 248
(Utah Ct. App. I9i;0) decided under former
Rule 10, Utah R. Ct. App.).
Time for filing.
A motion for summary disposition that is
clearly meritorious supports a suspension of
the time limitation contained in this rule.
Baile
y v- Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Cited in Benchmark, Inc. v. Salt Lake
Valley Mental Health Bd., Inc., 830 P.2d 218
(Utah 1991).

Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket sheet,
shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified
by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for
the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under
paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. Immediately upon filing of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all of the original
papers and any transcript filed in that court in chronological order and shall
prepare a chronological index'of those papers. The index shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper was filed in the trial court and the
starting page of the record on which the paper will be found. Clerks of the
trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking
out the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an
appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall
consist of the following.
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the
papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be transmitted to the appellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In
such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court,
simultaneously with the filing of appellant's reply brief, notice of the
date on which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial
court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief.
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers
are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the
trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or sepa-
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same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Allegation of facts required.
Because defendant did not allege any facts in
support of his ineffective assistance claim, the
appellate court would not remand the case for
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper

to remand a claim under this rule for a fishing
expedition. State v. Garrett, 849 P 2d 578
(Utah Ct App.), cert, denied, 860 P. 943 (Utah
1993).

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy,
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with
the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefe
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the
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actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered,
and received or rejected.
(f) Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form.
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document
subject to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum.
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (f) of this rule.
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant.
d) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief
must now contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of
review and citation of supporting authority

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, added the
third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made styhstic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7).

